One afternoon early in 1966, I returned from a photo recon mission, and the plane captain on the flight-line told me I had a call waiting in the Ready Room. Thinking it would be Gratia with a request, I answered the telephone to hear, "This is Al Shepard in the NASA Astronaut Office. We want to know if you still want to work for us!" A few weeks later in April, 1966, I reported for duty at the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, Texas, with 18 other new astronauts in Group 5. At the time, we joined a cadre of about 35 present astronauts, including the Mercury Original Seven; pretty "fast company" for a new guy! The flight of Gemini 8 had just been flown, and most veteran astronauts were either finishing Gemini or preparing for Apollo flights to the Moon. Early training for we, who facetiously branded ourselves as the "Original Nineteen", included checkouts in the T-38 and T-33 jet airplanes that would enable us to maintain our flying skills and provide transportation to many spacecraft development and training facilities around the country. We also received extensive training in orbital mechanics, space physics, astronomy, medical aspects of spaceflight, earth and lunar geology, survival situations, Apollo spacecraft operations and systems, flight procedures and techniques, etc. Some of the training was in simulators, vacuum chambers, planetariums, and at other NASA field centers. There was an 'all-astronauts' meeting every Monday morning to update us on the status of upcoming missions, announce new flight crew assignments, and to coordinate office activities. In a few months, individual assignments to collateral duties were integrated into the training program. Some of these assignments were to ensure the designs of "pilot/user" operational aspects of spacecraft, equipment, suits, simulators, experiments, etc. were compatible with both crew-safety and human factor requirements established by NASA engineering and the astronaut corps. We often traveled to contractor facilities to work directly with the design engineers at their drawing boards and in their spacecraft mockups.
My first collateral assignment came early and resulted from my experience as a photo recon pilot. There was a plan to use Apollo spacecraft for applications other than lunar landings. One plan outfitted an Apollo spacecraft with a large attached module to perform manned, detailed photography of the lunar surface with a very fine resolution and classified terrain camera. Another application was to use the third stage (S-IVB) of the Saturn V moon rocket as a prototype space station by entering it and setting up operations; the so-called "wet workshop". The photo recon mission was abandoned, and the wet workshop was improved by a "dry workshop" that later became the Skylab Space Station. I also supported development of the Apollo Lunar Scientific Experiments Package (ALSEP) that was deployed on the Moon's surface on several Apollo 11 landings. During this time, I was also sent back to Pensacola for three weeks to learn how to fly helicopters in preparation for landing on the Moon which, after descent from lunar orbit, ends in a hover with translation forward and sideways prior to touchdown. Being all "straight-ahead" jet pilots, "hovering" was new to us, and helicopter flight was a good link to other lunar landing simulations. NASA had four helicopters we could schedule for this training.
We were also assigned to three-man "Support Crews" to relieve the Apollo flight crews from tasks that interfered with mission training. Support crews typically performed Test & Checkout at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on the Lunar Module (LM) and Command & Service Module (CSM), liaison with mission planners and checklist developers, attended many ad-hoc meetings, and assumed Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) duties in the Mission Control Center (MCC) during both the actual flight and its prior simulations. These assignments enabled we "new guys" to both contribute time and effort to the Apollo missions and gain experience needed to fly our own future spaceflights.
I was a Support Crew member for Apollos 9, 10, and 13, which consumed about two years of my career, much of it at KSC. My prime responsibilities were to be CAPCOM for Apollos 10 & 13 and Test & Checkout pilot for the Lunar Modules flown on Apollos 9 and 10. This testing was first performed with the LM standing alone at KSC and usually lasted several months. It was then moved to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) where it was stacked atop the Saturn V and tested again. After moving the "stacked" Saturn V rocket to the Launch Pad several weeks before Launch, the LM was tested again up to its final configuration as the countdown proceeded right up to a few hours just before Liftoff. I was involved in all of this LM testing. By Apollo 13 time, I had accumulated about 700 hours of actual LM cockpit experience and Lunar Module Simulator (LMS) training.
For Apollo 13, besides CAPCOM for LM inflight sequences, my responsibilities were directed primarily to the mission's lunar surface traverses and geological observations. We spent many hours on often volcanic terrain resembling the landing site to perfect the Apollo 13 crew's lunar surface operations. This was, however, not to be. The CSM explosion occurred about 55 hours into the mission, after having maneuvered to ensure it would be captured into orbit around the Moon. I had been on duty at the CAPCOM console for several hours, during which time the crew had televised a very informative television tour of the LM for us in the MCC and for their families in the viewing room behind us. The crew signed off, and the families went home feeling confident. Arriving home, however, their feelings were instantly reversed; totally opposite from what they had been at MCC. The Apollo 13 crew had reported, "Houston, we've had a problem". This was confirmed in the MCC, but data needed from the CSM to analyze the problem was missing, apparently due to loss of the telemetry system. The flight crew had reported a loud explosion, several Caution & Warning lights, and declining electrical power. It became evident the oxygen supply used by the fuel cells to generate electricity was being depleted, and it would be necessary for the crew to move into the LM, activate its systems, and use it as a "lifeboat" for the four-day return to Earth.
While all Flight Controllers in the MCC could listen to the flight crew's reports, only the CAPCOM, who is always an astronaut, could talk to the crew. My job was to anticipate what the crew needed and to articulate the Flight Director's instructions to them in a manner that inspired confidence in our team and its plan for their safe return as well as our ability to execute it. I stayed on duty about 14 hours until the execution of the plan was well underway. I shared duty with two other CAPCOMs for the remainder of the return. The full details of Apollo 13 are chronicled in several books; they make exciting reading. To the general public, NASA made the return of the crew look easy, but internally NASA considered the Apollo 13 mission a failure. Commander Jim Lovell wrote a book about the adventure that was made into a movie. Despite full knowledge of its outcome the film was top-rated for several weeks. As a result, Apollo 13 became recognized as one of "NASA's finest hours!"
After Apollo 13 in April, 1970, I was assigned to provide astronaut inputs into the development and testing of the Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV), which would first fly on Apollo 15 and greatly increase our range of exploration on the Moon. The LRV went from drawing board to spaceflight in record time. Boeing was the prime contractor and subcontracted the chassis and its drive systems to a division of General Motors located in Santa Barbara, California. The LRV was electrically operated by solar-rechargeable batteries. The "tires" were made of stiffly-woven wire; no flat tires! Each wheel had its own drive motor. It could be steered by front-wheel, rear-wheel, or both front and rear-wheel operation using a hand-lever controlling both speed and steering. We test-drove the LRV prototype at nearby Pismo Beach, home of "dune-buggy" contraptions, on a prepared Moon-like crater field course. The LRC was compactly folded into a small triangular compartment in the side of the LM and was lowered by the astronaut pulling a deployment chain such that the LRV unfolded, cleverly landing on the surface with its wheels fully deployed.
When the "Original Nineteen" astronauts were selected, NASA had grandiose plans for many more, and longer, flights to the Moon. When we landed after only five Apollo missions and had soundly beaten the Russians to the Moon, the public attitude quickly became passe', and NASA's long-range plans were substantially trimmed down by making Apollo 20 its final landing. It became clear NASA had more lunar-trained astronauts than positions available. This was becoming likely when Apollo 20 was cancelled in January, 1970, and became certain when Apollos 18 and 19 were cancelled in September, shortly after Apollo 13's return. With all of my exposure to LM-related training and other preparation, I believed there was a good chance of being assigned a LM Pilot slot, but that was now obviously not to be. I was, however, shortly thereafter assigned to the second Skylab Space Station mission scheduled for 56 days in orbit in 1973.
We began training for Skylab late in 1970 for missions to be flown after Apollo 17 in 1973. Early in our training, however, there were occasional rumors of canceling Skylab in lieu of moving on to other projects. These rumors were worrisome enough to cause me to seek other alternatives, of which there were few, although about this same time in the early-1970's there was also a rumor of an Apollo joint flight with the Soviet Union to help establish an "era of détente" between our two nations by encouraging shared interests and cooperation across many disciplines, including spaceflight. Thinking this might be my last chance to fly in space sooner rather than later, I privately took a Russian language correspondence course for about a year, passed the final exam, and presented my diploma to the astronaut selection committee of one, Deke Slayton. Later, the Skylab missions became certain in NASA's planning, but I also found out who would command the flight with the Soviets after Skylab. Knowing I would not be assigned to another prime crew immediately after returning from Skylab, I asked that Commander if I could join his Backup crew. In due time, and prior to my Skylab mission, I was notified I would backup none other than Deke Slayton himself on the joint Apollo-Soyuz mission with the Soviets scheduled for July, 1975.